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STATE REGULATION OF
CAPITATED REIMBURSEMENT
FOR PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Robert C. Feightner, J.D.1
WANTED - Self-Funded Employer Health Benefit Plans Seek
PHOs and Other Integrated Delivery Systems to Manage Their
Employees' Healthcare, Restrain Costs. Good Capitated Rates
Paid. State Insurance Commissioners Need Not Apply. Call 29-
ERISA.
THE CONFLUENCE OF TWO DEVELOPMENTS in
the financing and delivery of employer-paid healthcare services
- capitated provider reimbursement and the increase in the
number of self-funded health plans - has drawn the rapt atten-
tion of insurance regulators. Numerous state insurance commis-
sioners,' as well as the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC),2 have taken the position that medical
providers who accept full or partial capitated payments directly
from self-funded employer groups are engaging in the "busi-
ness of insurance," and thus, must be licensed as a health in-
surer or health maintenance organization (HMO). Some states
have even taken the position that physician-hospital organiza-
t Healthcare and Corporate Law Attorney, Indianapolis, Indiana; L.L.M., Healthcare
Law, DePaul University, 1996; J.D., Cum Laude, Indiana University, 1988; B.A., Goshen
College, 1985.
1. See generally Georgia, Virginia Clamps Down on IDSs Taking Financial Risk,
MANAGED CARE WEEK, July 10, 1995, at 4. See also infra notes 22 to 42 and accompanying text.
2. See Memorandum from Kenney Shipley, Chair, Health Plan Accountability Working
Group, National Association of Insurance Commissioners to All Commissioners', Directors and
Superintendents (Aug. 10, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter NAIC Draft Bulletin]. The
NAIC Draft Bulletin outlines the National Association of Insurance Commissioner's position that
unless PHOs are licensed as HMOs or health insurers, they may not accept capitated payments
directly from self-funded payors, or accept risk in the form of a provider withhold. The NAIC
Draft Bulletin also contains a proposed letter that the state insurance commissioners may send to
PHOs and other medical providers advising them of the insurance commissioner's position upon
the unlicensed acceptance of risk.
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tions (PHOs) which accept pre-paid capitation, even from a
licensed HMO, must themselves become a licensed entity
PHOs, and other healthcare provider networks (sometimes
referred to as integrated delivery systems (IDSs))4 are increas-
ingly contracting directly with self-funded employer health
plans or alliances of employer plans for healthcare services for
their workers. These employer-sponsored plans sometimes
incorporate managed healthcare delivery features, such as gate-
keeper primary care physicians (physicians who limit the
member's ability to self-refer to a specialist) and utilization
management services. As these self-funded plans look increas-.
ingly more like HIMOs, likewise, the compensation mechanism
is changing to capitated reimbursement. Instead paying provid-
ers under a traditional fee-for-service method, the employer
pays a predetermined monthly amount to the provider in ex-
change for healthcare services for the employer's plan mem-
bers.5
This Article will address the issue of PHO regulations and
will advance the position that PHOs and other IDSs should be
permitted to directly contract with self-funded employer groups
and receive capitated compensation. It will begin with a brief
discussion of PHOs and their expanding role in the healthcare
delivery system. The Article will then examine the positions of
the NAIC and insurance commissioners with regard to PHOs
accepting capitated risk, and will examine the legal and factual
3. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
4. IDS is a protean term, and like the term "health reform." what is and what is not an IDS
is in the eye of the beholder (or the beholden). Clearly, a PHO is a form of IDS in that it integrates
(to various degrees) the physician and hospital components of the healthcare delivery continuum.
An IDS can incorporate more than a PHO by adding ancillary services, allied health providers,
neighboring hospitals, and neighboring physician groups. However, a PHO can still retain the
appellation PHO and add additional healthcare services. This Article will use the term PHO to
refer to the general type of entities which are the subject of insurance regulators' scrutiny, recog-
nizing that many PHOs integrate more components of healthcare delivery than a physician group
and a hospital. The term IDS will be used when specifically referred to in cited material, or when
necessary to describe an organizational model or entity which is far more extensive than the
paradigmatic PHO.
5. There are different methods of paying capitated rates. The HMO or other payor may
pay the primary care physician a capitated rate, and pay the specialist physicians on another basis
such as a discounted fee-for-service. The hospital could be paid on a "per diem" rate or by a DRG
(diagnostic-related group) method. An increasingly alternative method of compensation is to pay
a global capitated rate to the PHO. The PHO can then divide the compensation among its
constituent providers in a manner which it deems appropriate.
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basis for the position that PHOs which accept capitation are
improperly engaged in the "business of insurance." Close anal-
ysis demonstrates that the acceptance of capitation by PHOs is
not the unlicensed "business of insurance." Further, these em-
ployer-provider relationships may be free of state interference
because of the broad preemption provisions of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 Finally,
the position of the NAIC and certain state insurance commis-
sioners conflict diametrically with current changes in the
healthcare delivery marketplace.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HEALTHCARE
DELIVERY MARKET
Important changes are occurring in the healthcare delivery
system. Managed care is becoming a dominant mode of
healthcare financing and delivery. It is increasingly demanded
by employers, and likewise, is being encouraged at the state
and federal level.7 To offer a broader range of services, hospi-
tals and physician groups are aligning themselves in PHOs.
These PHOs stand alone as business entities distinct from
either the hospital or a multi-specialty physician group, and
they contract directly with HMOs, health plans, and other
payors. The growth of PHOs has been exponential. From an
estimated fifty PHOs in 1990, the number increased to two
thousand in 1994,8 and currently totals approximately three
thousand.9 There are two trade organizations for PHOs, the
American Association of Physician Hospital Organiza-
tions/Integrated Healthcare Delivery Systems, which is located
in Glen Allen, Virginia, and the National Association of Phy-
sician-Hospital/Integrated Health Organizations, which is locat-
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (exempting certain employee benefit
plans from state laws).
7. See Health Law Center, Hospital Physician Organizations, in 3B HOsPrrAL LAW
MANUAL '15-3 (Cynthia Conner et al. eds., 1993) (explaining that the development of integrated
service networks at the state level is a means of providing quality and cost-effective care).
8. See David Azevedo, PHOs: Castles in the Sand?, MED. ECON., Oct. 24, 1994, at 71,72
(remarking on the explosion of PHOs in the healthcare delivery market).
9. See Mary Jaklevic, PHOs Fall Short of Expectations, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 9,
1995, at 77 (estimating that 3,000 PHOs have formed since the early 1980s).
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ed in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The often-cited benefits of
forming a PHO are to create leverage in negotiations with
managed care companies by combining the hospital and physi-
cian care components into one unified entity, to develop more
control of practice standards and data management, and to
align incentives to allow the PHO to prosper from capitation
contracts with payors. PHOs are sometimes viewed as inter-
im steps on the vertical integration ladder-the penultimate
step before becoming a fully integrated delivery system that
can contract directly with self-fimded payors and third-party
administrators for a full continuum of healthcare delivery."
To compete effectively with HMOs and other managed care
delivery systems (such as tightly managed preferred provider
organizations (PPOs)), PHOs will need to accept full or partial
risk in the form of global or limited capitated payments. 2 It is
this acceptance of full or partial capitated risk, the next logical
step in PHO evolution, that draws the ire of insurance regula-
tors.
10. See id.
11. See id. See also Azevedo, supra note 8, at 71 (describing the ultimate goals of PHOs).
12. Cf. Azevedo, supra note 8, at78. Some commentators question whether PHOs are cost-
effective providers of medical services, and whether they can control utilization effectively
enough to prosper under capitated payment reimbursement. Although a discussion of the pros and
cons of PHOs from a business and cost perspective would be an interesting undertaking, it is re-
gretfully beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the business merits of PHOs as
healthcare delivery systems, refer to Azevedo, supra note 8 and, Jaklevic, supra note 9.
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HE. THE NATURE OF THE "RISK" THE PHO
INCURS
The amount and nature of the "risk"13 the PHO incurs
will change according to the way the compensation is struc-
tured. If the PHO's internal economic incentives are not prop-
erly aligned, then savings gained in one component of care can
be lost through the shifting of utilization to another. For exam-
ple, if only the primary care physicians are capitated, and the
specialist physicians and hospital in the PHO are paid on a fee-
for-service basis, there can still be overutilization of services.
Unless there is a method to link the utilization of the special-
ists and the hospital to the primary care physician's referral
and hospital admission patterns, the primary care physician's
incentive will be to rely more on the services of the specialist
and the hospital, and conserve her time and resources for other
activities. Conversely, the PHO's internal incentives could be
misaligned to provide incentives for the hospital to shift utiliza-
tion to the physicians and ancillary providers. In either case,
these would not be compensation arrangements which maxi-
mized the healthcare plan's capital." Further, if members
were hospitalized more frequently or incurred greater waiting
time to see specialist physicians, such members would incur
higher opportunity costs because of the less-than-efficient de-
13. This Article will frequently use the term "risk," but not in the same context that an
insurance regulator would use the term. One of the main premises of this Article is that the "risk"
the PHO incurs under capitation is not an impermissible "insurance risk," but risk of a type which
any contracting party can assume in a transaction, i.e., "business risk." For the definition of
"insurance risk," refer infra note 46 and accompanying text.
The PHO does not accept "insurance risk" because it is the employer who incurs the
"risk" of ultimately providing healthcare services to the employer. The funds "at risk" to pay for
the employee's healthcare services are the general assets of the company. The employer will often
pay the -IMO or the PHO a monthly capitated amount per member (usually expressed as "per
member, per month," or "PMPM"). If the employer group fails to pay the premiums, the PHO
would not be obligated to continue to provide healthcare services to the employer group's mem-
bers. The employer would, however, remain obligated to provide healthcare benefits to its
employees and the employees' dependents.
14. The Author suggests that the analogy of squeezing a balloon is instructive when
considering achieving the maximum value of PHO capitation. If one can wrap one's hands around
the entire balloon, the balloon can be compressed. However, if the balloon can squirt through
between one's fingers, or in other places where the hands do not completely clasp, the balloon
escapes compression. Similarly, squeezing only some, but not all, of the utilization vectors in the
PHO can result in inefficient care delivery as incentives and utilization patterns are misaligned.
3051997]
HEALTH MATRIX
livery of healthcare. The more risk the PHO takes, the greater
the chance it can more efficiently deliver healthcare to the
plan's members because the risk of inappropriate utilization
will fall upon all providers in the PHO. The greater the risk the
PHO assumes, however, the more suspect it becomes in the
eyes of insurance department bureaucrats. The nature and
amount of risk accepted by the PHO is taken into consideration
by many insurance commissioners when considering whether to
consider the PHO's risk assumption to be the "business of
insurance." The NAIC, however, considers any acceptance of
what it deems "insurance risk" by the provider who is contract-
ing with a self-funded payor to be the "business of insur-
ance."'5 The only permissible provider risk in the NAIC Draft
Bulletin is a PHO accepting capitated payments from a li-
censed HMO or other health insurer."
The Group Health Association of America (GHAA) pre-
pared a survey of state insurance regulator's positions regard-
ing PHO assumption of risk. 7 The GHAA developed a para-
digm to describe the types and nature of risk accepted by
PHOs, and used the paradigm in querying the regulators of all
fifty states and the District of Columbia. The GHAA paradigm
will be adopted in this Article when discussing the types of
PHO risk, with only a few clarification points added. This
paradigm is set out below:
Option One (No Risk): The PHO contracts directly with the
employer, and the PHO is paid on a fee-for-service basis for all
medical services. The employer retains the full insurance risk
for the cost of employee medical services.
Option Two (Full Risk): The PHO contracts directly with the
employer, and the PHO is paid on a prepaid, capitated basis for
all medical services.
Option Three (Partial Risk): The PHO contracts directly with
the employer and a budget is established, usually on an annual
basis, to pay for all medical services. At the end of the contract
15. See NAIC Draft Bulletin, supra note 2, at 3.
16. Seeid
17. See GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (GHAA), PHOs AND THE ASSUMPTION
oF INsuRANCE RIsK: A 50-STATE SURVEY OF REGuLAToRs' ATriruDEs TOwARD PHO
LicENsRE 1, 4 (July 10, 1995). The findings of this survey are discussed infra notes 22 to 30 and
accompanying text, as well as in Appendix A.
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period, the PHO is liable for any services above the budgeted
amount up to 110 percent of the budget. If the cap is not
reached, the PHO splits the savings with the employer.'"
Option Four (Downstream Risk): The PHO contracts with a
licensed health plan to provide medical coverage pursuant to a
group policy, and the PHO is paid on a prepaid, capitated basis.
The licensed health plan contracts with one or more employer
groups.
19
This paradigm will be used in this Article to describe the de-
gree to which PHOs assume risk in reimbursement relation-
ships with employer health plans. However, Option Two may
be further broken down into situations where the PHO itself is
paid a global capitalization rate, and where only some PHO
services are capitated, and some are paid in another manner.
I. THE POSITIONS OF STATE INSURANCE
REGULATORS REGARDING PHO
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
In addition to the GHAA survey referred to above, another
study has been prepared by the national accounting firm of
Ernst & Young.2" The Ernst & Young study used different
categories than the GHAA paradigm categories to query regu-
lators. Although the results were not coterminous because of
differences in the querying methodology, both studies found
that most regulators believed that PHOs must be licensed as
HMOs if they wished to accept full or partial capitated risk.'
18. This ten percent loss below or above the budgeted amount is often called a "risk
corridor." This ten percent "risk corridor" is usually funded with "withhold" or a reserve pool, or
perhaps a combination of both. "Withholds" are amounts withheld from the fees paid to providers.
For example, if the budgeted amount for a service is one hundred dollars, the provider would be
paid only ninety dollars with ten dollars being held by the payor as a withhold. At the end of the
contract year, if the group's claims healthcare experience is equivalent to the budgeted claims
amount, the withhold is returned to the provider. If the claims experience is worse than estimated,
part or all of the withhold is retained by the payor to recoup the claims loss. The cost of services
which exceed the withhold of the budgeted amount will be borne by the payor. Similarly, reserve
pools are amounts withheld from the capitated payment to fund losses within the "risk corridor."
Losses outside this risk corridor are absorbed by the payor, or sometimes shared through other
mechanisms between the provider and payor.
19. See GHAA, supra note 17, at 4.
20. ERNST & YOUNG, LLP, PHYSICIAN HOSPITAL ORGANIZTIONS: STATE REGULATORS
PLAY CATCH-UP (Ernst & Young ed. 1994).
21. Seeid.at4-5.
22. See id. at 4. This Article will not reproduce the positions of all fifty states. However, a
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For Option Two (Full Risk), the GHAA study found that forty-
one states would require PHO licensure, nine had not formally
developed a position but would not permit full risk taking by a
PHO, and only the District of Columbia would permit a PHO
to accept full risk capitation from self-insured payors without
licensure.' The Ernst & Young study apparently did not que-
ry the District of Columbia.24 However, this study found that
none of the states would permit full risk capitation from multi-
ple employer groups contracting with a PHO, but Illinois and
Kansas had unwritten policies permitting a PHO to accept full
capitated risk from a single employer.' Subsequent to the
completion of the 1994 Ernst & Young study, in April of 1996,
the Illinois Department of Insurance announced in a written
bulletin that it would permit PHOs and other IDSs to accept
capitated payments directly from self-funded employer plans.'
The Ernst & Young study did not break their risk categories
down between full and partial risk, however. Regarding Option
Three, limited insurance risk, the GHAA study found that
twenty-five state insurance commissioners would not permit
PHOs to accept such risk without licensure, and again, only the
District of Columbia categorically would permit such partial
risk assumption.27 The other twenty-five states were catego-
rized as "unclear," meaning that the state's policy was either
"uncertain" or "undecided."' The GHAA survey noted that
many of the regulators in the states categorized as "unclear"
stated they would have to look at each arrangement individual-
ly. 29
Option Three, condemned by many insurance regulators as
an improper assumption of "insurance risk," is a fairly com-
mon relationship. The ten percent "risk corridor '" is in effect
simulation of the GHAA survey matrix is attached as Appendix A.
23. See GHAA supra note 17, at5, 11-12.
24. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 20, at 1.
25. See id. at 5.
26. See David Grant, Provider Based Market Systems - When to Regulate, 2 ILL. INS.
BULL., Apr. 1, 1996, at 1.
27. See GHAA supra note 17, at 5, 11-17.
28. See id. at 5.
29. See id. at 7 (discussing that states are unsure whether or not to make risk assumption
part of their licensing process).
30. See supra note 18 for a discussion of "risk corridor."
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"pre-funded" by the PHO agreeing to the withhold. If the risk
corridor is ten percent, and there is a ten percent withhold, the
risk is prefunded. If the total cost of healthcare services pro-
vided to plan members totals 110 percent of the budgeted
amount, the withhold is consumed. If the PHO successfully
manages utilization, it may keep some or all of the withhold.
Option Four is the "downstream" transfer of risk. This is
the relatively common scenario where a licensed HMO pays a
capitated payment to a PHO or other provider for members of
the HMO. Two states, California and Nevada, told the GHAA
that they would require that PHOs which accept capitated pay-
ments, even from licensed entities, must themselves become
licensed." Texas also does not permit PHOs to accept global
capitation for both physician and hospital services.32 This Ar-
ticle will not seek to reproduce the results of the GHAA and
Ernst & Young surveys. However, a review of correspondence
and statements from various state insurance regulators provides
an illustration of a general condemnation of the acceptance of
capitation from a non-regulated entity or a self-funded employ-
er plan.
A 1990 Maryland Attorney General Opinion addressed a
health plan marketed to employee groups by a third-party ad-
ministrator.33  The health plan was called "Healthnet."
Healthnet accepted capitated fees from employer groups and
deducted an administrative fee from the capitated payment.3 '
Healthnet then contracted with some licensed HMOs, other
health plans, and directly with some providers.35 The Mary-
land Attorney General found that while Healthnet was not
subject to the insurance commissioner's jurisdiction, the pro-
viders of healthcare under direct contract with Healthnet were
31. See GHAA, supra note 17, at 8 (discussing the policies of California and Nevada which
require PHO licensing). California does not permit providers to capitate for healthcare services
that such provider renders unless such provider is licensed as an HMO. However, the physician
component of a PHO could capitate for physician services and the hospital component could
capitate for the hospital services. See id.
32. Letter from Leah Rummel, Director, HMOIURA, to Texas Medical Providers (Sunmner
1995) (on file with author).
33. Insurance - Jurisdiction of Ins. Comm'r. - Health Benefits Program, 1990 Md. Att'y
Gen. LEXIS 30, at *1 (1990) (concluding that the health benefits program, known as "Healthnet,"
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commission).
34. Seeid.at*l-*2.
35. See id. at *2-*3.
3091997]
HEALTH MATRIX
engaged in the "business of insurance."' The Maryland Attor-
ney General addressed the question of whether the self-funded
employer plan arrangement with Healthnet and the provider
triggered ERISA preemption.3 7 The Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral did not engage in any analysis to determine whether the
healthcare providers were engaged in the unlicensed "business
of insurance." Rather, the Attorney General merely assumed
that the providers were engaged in the business of insurance,
and cursorily noted that while ERISA preempts state regulation
of employee benefit plans, ERISA still allows states to contin-
ue to regulate the sale of insurance.38 The cases cited by the
Maryland Attorney General, however, did not stand for the
cited propositions.39 The subject employee benefit vehicles in
the cases cited by the Maryland Attorney General' were
somewhat crude variants of multiple employer welfare benefit
plans. These courts found that the instant plans were not em-
ployee welfare benefit plans which are favored with ERISA
preemption.
Similarly, the Ohio Department of Insurance, in a letter to
the Ohio Hospital Association, stated that a capitated arrange-
ment between a PHO and a self-insured employer transfers all
of the risk from the employer to the PHO.41 The letter goes
on to state that no degree of risk acceptance by an unlicensed
36. Seeid.at*13.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id., citing Taggert Corp. v. Efros, 475 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (describing
that the subject plan was not established by employer(s) as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)), affd,
617 F.2d 1208 (1980); Matthew 25 Ministries, Inc. v. Corcoran, 771 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1985)
(concluding that instant plan operator was not a bonafide employer or employee organization
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n., 437 F. Supp. 382 (D.
Kan. 1977) (holding that the ESBA plan was not an "employee benefit plan"). However, Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company v. Massachusetts Travelers Insurance Company, would generally
support the Attorney General's position. 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that a state statute that
regulates insurance is not preempted by ERISA).
40. "Multiple Employee Welfare Arrangements" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (40)(A)
(West 1985) as benefit plans that are established or maintained for the employees of two or more
employers. These arrangements are subject to state insurance insolvency laws. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(6)(A) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (providing that fully insured multiple employer welfare
arrangements are subject to state insurance insolvency laws).
41. Letter from David J. Randall, Deputy Director, Ohio Department ofInsurance, to John
E. Callender, Senior Vice President, Ohio Hospital Association 3 (July 28, 1994) (on file with
author).
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entity is permissible under Ohio law without licensure.42 The
positions of Ohio and Maryland represent the position of the
NAIC Draft Bulletin. The flaws in the assumptions of the
Maryland Attorney General and the Ohio Deputy Insurance
Director's claim that the PHO/self-funded employer capitated
arrangement is the unlicensed business of insurance will be
addressed in the next section.
IV. THE NAIC DRAFT BULLETIN
The NAIC Draft Bulletin was a by-product of the Health
Plan Accountability Working Group of the Regulating Frame-
work Task Force.43 This working group was established to
examine the existing rules regarding healthcare plan legislation.
The group was also formed to consider the development of a
single model healthcare licensing act for all "health carriers."
This model act, which has since been drafted, would cover
HMOs, PPOs, point-of-service plans, fee-for-service plans,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, commercial plans, and all other
entities that finance and deliver healthcare services on a risk
basis." In the course of conducting public hearings to prepare
this model act, the working group discovered self-funded em-
ployer groups were bypassing HMOs and insurers, and going
directly to the source of healthcare, mainly, PHOs and other
IDSs. This belated discovery of marketplace reality prompted
the NAIC Draft Bulletin.4'
The NAIC takes the position that any assumption of risk
by healthcare providers who contract directly with an employer
constitutes the "business of insurance" and requires licensure as
an HMO or other health insurer.6 This includes not only full
or partial capitation, but also arrangements which "include risk
corridors, withold [sic] or pooling arrangements."'47 In reach-
ing the conclusion that the foregoing arrangements amount to
the "business of insurance," the NAIC sets out the following
42. Id.
43. See NAIC Draft Bulletin, supra note 2, at 1.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 3.
47. Id
1997]
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definition from the Florida District Court of Appeals case of
Professional Lens Plan, Incorporated v. Department of
Insurance.' The elements of an "insurance contract" are:
1. An insurable interest;
2. Risk of loss;
3. An assumption of risk by the insurer,
4. A general scheme to distribute the loss among the larger
group of persons bearing similar risks; and,
5. The payment of a premium for the assumption of risk.
However, in applying this definition to PHO/self-funded em-
ployer arrangements, the NAIC misconstrues the nature of the
relationship. The NAIC is correct when it asserts that the first
two elements enumerated above are satisfied. Clearly, an em-
ployer has an insurable interest in the health of its employees
through the terms of a health-benefit plan.49 Also, the employ-
er does incur the risk of loss when it establishes a direct con-
tractual relationship with its employees through a self-funded
plan. The assets at risk are the general assets of the employer's
company. ° However, the NAIC, just as some of its constitu-
ent insurance commissioner members had earlier done, incor-
rectly draws the conclusion that the PHO provider is the party
who assumes the risk as an "insurer."
The third element of the "business of insurance" test is an
assumption of risk by the party deemed to be the insurer.51
The NAIC discounts the essential element that differentiates
the PHO-employer transaction from the insured-insurer transac-
tion. It is the employer who is directly obligated to provide
healthcare services to the employee, not the PHO. This lack of
direct and contracted obligation between the employee and the
PHO was cited by the Illinois Department of Insurance in its
April 1996 bulletin which permits PHOs and other IDSs to
contract directly with self-funded employee groups on a
capitated basis and upon other risk-sharing bases. 2 There is
48. 387 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1980). It is interesting to note that the Florida District Court of
Appeals in this case found that the arrangement did not constitute the "business of insurance." Id.
at 551.
49. See NAIC Draft Bulletin, supra note 2, at 5.
50. See id.
51. See id. See also Professional Lens, 387 So. 2d at 550.
52. See Grant, supra note 26, at 1.
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no contractual relationship between the employee and the PHO.
Every operative term which obligates the employer to provide
healthcare to the employee is contained in the health benefit
plan document.53 The PHO only appears in the directory of
participating providers. If the PHO facilities (for example,
hospital and provider group offices) were bombed by terrorists
or destroyed by a natural disaster, the employer would still be
forced to go down the street to another provider for the benefit
plan services. The "force majeure" clause, which is probably
contained in the healthcare provider contract between the em-
ployer group and the PHO, or the agreement between the PHO
and a third-party administrator who is acting on behalf of the
employer, will excuse the PHO from performance. But more
realistically, if the PHO does become insolvent, cease opera-
tion, or defaults on its contractual obligations, the primary
employer-employee health benefit contract still exists and must
be discharged through other healthcare service providers.
The NAIC also likens the employer to a consumer who
requires the paternalistic protection of insurance laws. The
NAIC Draft Bulletin states that an "employer has an expecta-
tion that when it prepays a fixed amount to someone to take
over a variable obligation belonging to them, that the person or
entity will be there when the time comes to perform."'54 This
is quite true. However, the employer expects the same perfor-
mance from any party with whom it contracts, and does not
require the department of insurance to regulate the terms and
conditions of its contracts with vendors, suppliers, and service
providers.
In actuality, the risks to the employee of not receiving
healthcare benefits has changed little, if at all, where his em-
ployee contracts with a PHO on a capitated basis. Employers
fund their self-insured benefit plans with the assistance of
benefit-design consultants and actuarial analysis. They often
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Sup. V. 1993) which provides that participants
or beneficiaries under a plan may bring an action "to recover benefits" due him under the terms of
the plan. See also Bullwinkel v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 429,430-31 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that an ERISA health plan is a contract); N.W. Laundry & Dry Cleaners Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Burzynsld, 27 F.3d 153, 156 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating ERISA plan must be
interpreted as any other contract), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995).
54. NAIC Draft Bulletin, supra note 2, at 6.
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purchase "stop loss" insurance to protect them from large
healthcare claims. Moreover, PHOs typically protect them-
selves with cost outliers that supplement the capitated rate
when an employee incurs substantial expense.55 Likewise,
PHOs typically purchase provider-excess insurance or provider
reinsurance to protect them from substantial medical expenses.
Additionally, the PHO, unlike an employer (or an insurer) is
the actual provider of the healthcare, not merely a payor. Thus,
it can internally subsidize the cost of uncompensated care,
through foregone profits and lost opportunity costs, more effi-
ciently than an entity that can only write checks for the cost of
healthcare services provided by others.5 6 But while the risk of
nontreatment of an employee's illness has changed little, if at
all, the perceived ability of insurance regulators to expand their
jurisdiction has. Self-funded employer benefit plans are clearly
exempt from state regulation under ERISA when paying fee-
for-service reimbursement to providers.57 However, when
these self-funded plans seek to take advantage of cost-reducing
marketplace trends such as provider capitation, these regulators
find the entre6 that will allow them to retake lost regulating
territory.
V. CURRENT STATE PHOIDS-PAYOR
REGULATION
Minnesota and Iowa have rules in place which regulate
PHOs/IDSs and Payors. These rules are promulgated, respec-
tively, in the Minnesota Integrated Service Network Ac' and
55. A cost outlier is a mechanism where, for example, if the cost of hospital care for an
employee-patient exceeds $50,000 for an incident of illness, the reimbursement mechanism might
charge from the monthly capitated premium for such employee up to 80% of the providers' billed
charges for such services.
56. See Eric Weissenstein & Jonathan Gardner, Foiled on PSNs, Hospitals Oppose Budget,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 20, 1995, at 4. Provider groups argued to United States House of
Representative and Senate Republican leaders that provider networks are "fundamentally different
from insurers and should not have to meet the same requirements." For example, "they [provider
representatives] say that providers should not have to meet the same solvency requirements as
insurers because they are the organizations providing the care, unlike insurers, who must keep
adequate cash on hand to pay their claims." Id.
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (providing that only fully funded em-
ployer benefit plans are subject to state regulations).
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.01 (West 1995).
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the Iowa Organized Delivery Systems regulations. 9 The stated
purpose of the Minnesota statute is to:
[A]llow the creation of integrated service networks that will be
responsible for arranging for or delivering a full array of
healthcare services, from routine primary and preventive care
through acute inpatient hospital care, to a defined population for
a fixed price from a purchaser.'
The statute basically allows for the formation of "mini
HMOs" with slimmed-down reserve and reporting require-
ments. The provisions of the statute are regulated by the Min-
nesota Healthcare Commission,61 not the Department of Insur-
ance. The statute sets out two types of networks: Integrated
Service Networks (ISNs),62 and Community Integrated Service
Networks (CISNs).63 ISNs are large networks with more than
fifty thousand members, and may accept capitated payments or
other risk sharing reimbursement formulas from self-insured
payors.6 CISNs are networks with less than fifty thousand
members.' It is in regard to CISNs that the Minnesota stat-
utory mechanism lifts significant burdens that are placed on
ISNs and HMOs. For example, ISNs are exempt from filing
yearly quality assurance plans, 66 maintaining required statis-
tics,' filing annual marketing plans, ' and filing provider
contract forms. 69 The CISN requirements do contain a net
worth minimum of one million dollars,7 but also provide that
59. IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 641-201 (1996).
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62.01.2 (West 1995).
61. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62N.02.3, 62N.02.4 (West 1995) (defining "commission"
and "commissioner").
62. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.02.8 (West 1995) (defining "integrated service
networks').
63. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.02.4(a) (West 1995) (defining "community integrated
service network").
64. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.02.8(b) (West 1995) (explaining "integrated service
networks").
65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.02.4a(a) (West 1995) (describing "community integrated
service networks").
66. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.25.7(2) (West 1995).
67. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.25.7(3) (West 1995).
68. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.25.7(6) (West 1995).
69. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.25.7(4) (West 1995).
70. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.28.1(1) (West 1995) (describing Minnesota's net worth
requirement for HMOs). This net worth requirement may also be phased in. See MmIN. STAT.
ANN. § 62N.28.4 (West 1995). New Minnesota HMOs, by contrast, must have a net worth of at
least $1,500,000, or 8 1/3% of amount of all expenses to be incurred in the year following the
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this amount can be secured by certain "guaranteeing organiza-
tions," organizations that obligate themselves to maintain the
CISNs financial reserves for the CISNs.71
Also, the ISN/CISN statute has a mechanism for accredit-
ing providers who want to provide capitated services to
ISNs/CISNs. These providers, called "Accredited Capitated
Providers, ' must demonstrate to the Minnesota Commission-
er of Health that they have the operational and financial capac-
ity to provide services to the network on an on-going basis,
and for a period of 120 days after the insolvency of the net-
work, a period of time in which the provider would not receive
payment from the CISN for its services.73 Additionally, the
CISN can reduce its net worth requirement by up to the
amount by which its net worth exceeds one million dollars by
"ceding" financial risk to accredited capitated providers.74
This "risk-ceding" mechanism permits the CISN to allocate
capitated risk to providers, and permits it to lower its net worth
requirement to one million dollars.75 The amount of risk ceded
is the percentage that all capitated rate payments made by the
CISN bears to all premium revenue received by the CISN in a
contract year.76 This risk-ceding mechanism could greatly
lessen the burden upon CISNs, and could assist in forming eco-
nomic "partnerships" between the providers who serve the
CISNs. At a minimum, the Minnesota law represents an at-
tempt to recognize smaller community provider-payor relation-
ships which do not require all of the regulatory burdens placed
upon traditional HMOs.
issuance of certificate of authority, whichever is greater. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.042.1 (a) &
62D.042.2(a)-(b) (West 1995) (describing net worth and working capital requirements for
Minnesota HMOs). Also, Minnesota H1MOs must deposit the greater of $500,000 or 33% of their
uncovered expenses from the previous year. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.041.3-4 (West 1995).
71. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N29 (West 1995). See also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62D.043 (West 1995).
72. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N31 (West 1995) (stating the standards for capitated
provider accreditation).
73. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N27 (West 1995) (defining the period of time for which the
capitated provider is accredited).
74. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62N27(5), 62N27(6) (West 1995) (allowing service
networks to cede their financial risk to their accredited capitated providers).
75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N27.5 (West 1995) (allowing service networks to allocate
the risk through providers).
76. See id. (explaining that premium revenue can be received by the service network during
any contract year).
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The Iowa "Organized Delivery System" (ODS) rules, in
contrast to the Minnesota CISN" mechanism, place burden-
some reporting, structural, and member relations requirements
upon ODSs. While these regulations may be necessary for
statewide or regional ODSs, they do not reflect the lesser re-
quirements of smaller community ODSs which the Minnesota
CISN laws recognizes. The application process and require-
ments are those typically required by other states for HMO
applications, such as a detailed complaint resolution and recor-
dation system," service area descriptions, coverage require-
ments,79 and reporting requirements8" which mandate detailed
profiling of membership and utilization.8' The financial re-
serve requirement in the ODS rules is one million dollars, or
three times the ODS's average monthly claims amount, which-
ever is larger.8 2 This is equivalent to the Minnesota CISN
rule. 3 However, Iowa ODSs must post a surety bond with the
Iowa Insurance Commissioner, and the rules contain invest-
ment limitations on the ODS's assets84 which are analogous to
the limits that states place on insurance company assets. One
area the ODS rules provide for is antitrust exemptions, 5 a
mechanism not present in the Minnesota CISN and ISN rules.
In comparing the Minnesota statute and the Iowa rules, it
is apparent that Minnesota legislators have given CISN's relief
from HMO-type regulation to serve local needs, while Iowa's
regulators have maintained bureaucratic "HMO-like" controls
over ODSs. While these statutes do reflect at least some recog-
nition that full HMO or insurance licensure is not necessary for
IDSs to operate, they still represent government intervention in
an area where state regulation may not be permitted, the rela-
tionship between self-funded employer groups and providers. 6
77. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.02.4(a) (West 1995).
78. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 641-201.7 (1996).
79. See IowAADMN. CODE § 641-201.5 (1996.
80. See IOWA ADmN. CODE § 641-201.8 (1996).
81. See IOWA AnMN. CODE §642-201.8 (4) (1996).
82. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 641-201.12(2) (1996).
83. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N28.4 (West 1995).
84. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 201.13 (1996).
85. See IOWA ADmN. CODE § 641-201.20 (1996).
86. Self-funded plans' relations with PHOs and other providers and IDSs should be free of
state regulation, both because of ERISA and the sophisticated nature of the purchaser. However,
state regulation should still be involved when individuals, very small employers, and small
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VI. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION
OF SELF-FUNDED HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS
The potential "trump card" that an employer self-funded
health benefit plan can play in disputes with state laws and
state regulators is the broad preemption provisions of 29
U.S.C. § 1144. The preemption provision, and its limits, are set
out below.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter mH of this chapter
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title.
(b)(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any per-
son from any law of any State which regulates insurance, bank-
ing, or securities.
(b)(2)(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance or bank-
ing for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust compa-
nies, or investment companiesY
Basically, Section 1144(a) preempts "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan."" However, Section 1144(b)(2)(a), the
"savings clause," goes on to state that "nothing... shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
state which regulates insurance, banking or securities." At this
juncture, it appears that the preemption provisions that Con-
gress gave with one hand to employer-sponsored benefit plans,
associations purchase coverage. In this regard, HMO-like protection should be in place when such
purchasers buy coverage directly from community PHOs and IDSs. Perhaps Minnesota's CISN
rules could serve as a template for other states' operation of community IDSs.
87. 29 U.S.C. § l144(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (enumerating preemption,
construction, and application of section 1144).
88. U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
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it took back with the other. However, the "deemer" clause
comes to the rescue and provides that "an employer benefit
plan... shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance compa-
ny... or engaged in the business of insurance... for pur-
poses of any law of any state purporting to regulate insur-
ance." 9 The interplay of the "deemer" and "savings" clauses
establishes a bifurcated mode of analysis of state benefit law
regulation. If the state law regulates the insurance-benefit prod-
uct offered by the employer plan, it is saved from preemp-
tion.9' Thus, Utah could require that underwritten employee-
group health plans contain benefits for birth control drugs and
devices, or North Carolina could mandate group health plan
benefits for cigarette smoking cessation. However, if the em-
ployer plan is self-funded, these hypothetical state laws would
be preempted.9 State insurance laws, because they "relate to"
the employer's self-funded capitated payment of health benefit
plans, and are inapplicable to such plans because of the
"deemer" clause, are preempted by ERISA.
The most recent pronouncement regarding ERISA preemp-
tion is the U.S. Supreme Court case of New York Conference
of Blue Cross v. Travelers Insurance Company' which was
decided on April 26, 1995. This case involved a New York
statute which requires hospitals to collect surcharges from pa-
tients whose services were reimbursed by commercial health
insurance, and also requires HMOs to pay varying surcharges
based on their number of Medicaid members.93 The purpose
of this statute was to raise the cost of commercial insurance for
carriers other than Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and to shift
market share back to the economically threatened Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plan.94 The Court, after discussing its prior
89. Id.
90. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ma. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 746 (1985). For
additional discussion of ERISA preemption, refer to the following: Tex. Pharmacy Ass'n v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1019, 1025-26 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that ERISA preempts
"any willing provider laws"), affd, modified, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2723 (5th Cir. Feb. 14,
1997); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., No. LR-C-95-514 (Jan. 14, 1997 E.D.
Ark.) (holding that the Arkansas Patient Protection Act was preempted by ERISA).
91. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins., 471 U.S. at 747.
92. 115.Ct. 1671(1995).
93. See id. at 1673.
94. See id. at 1678-79.
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ERISA decisions and discussing the purpose of the preemption
clause, held that the surcharges were not preempted because
they only had an indirect economic effect on the cost of health
insurance, and, therefore, did not "relate to" employee benefit
plans within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144. Although the
Court held that state laws that have only an indirect economic
effect, such as New York's surcharges, do not have a great
enough nexus with employee health benefit plans to "relate to"
them for ERISA preemption purposes, it did restate holdings
which should still trigger preemption of state limitations on
PHO/self-funded employer plan capitation reimbursement.
The Court's discussion of the New York surcharges differ-
entiates the surcharges from state laws which affect benefit
plan design or administration. It cited Shaw v. Delta Airlines"
which held that a New York law that prohibited benefit dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy and required specific
pregnancy benefits "related to" employee benefit plans, was
preempted.' Similarly, the Court distinguished the surcharges
from the preempted Pennsylvania law in FMC Corporation v.
Holliday" which purported to prevent plans from pursuing
subrogation rights on behalf of their members against tort
feasors. 9 Additionally, the Court reiterated its decision in
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Incorporated,"® where it held
that a New Jersey law that purported to prohibit pension plans
from offsetting workers' compensation awards against
employees' pension was preempted by ERISA.' ' Differenti-
ating those cases from the instant case, the Court relied on the
fact that the preempted state laws in those cases mandated
employee benefit structures or their administration. 2 These
laws would force the employer to adopt a different benefit
structure or administrative mechanism in the states where the
offending laws were in effect. With the Supreme Court's reiter-
95. See id. at 1680.
96. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
97. See Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
98. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
99. See Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
100. 451 U.S. 504(1981).
101. See Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
102. See id.
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ation of ERISA preemption with regard to laws °3 which
mandate benefit structures or administration in hand, a template
for a preemption attack on state PHO capitation proscriptions
may be developed.
There are many reasons why self-funded employer plans
might choose to contract directly with PHOs on a capitated
basis. Some examples are as follows:
A. Lower cost of benefit plan: By circumventing an HMO, the
employer cuts out the middle man's administrative fees and
profits.
B. Self-administered plans could save claim administration fees
and greatly streamline administrative procedures nationwide by
capitating their providers, instead of paying claims individually
on a fee-for-service basis.
C. Benefit compensation structures with capitated providers
give providers the incentive to manage the health and
"wellness" of employees, not merely treat the conditions."
Direct capitation contracts with PHOs will allow employers to
tailor their own plans to achieve this end.
Under the Travelers rationale, however, Example A would
not in and of itself support preemption. If the only benefit to
the plan, if freed from the state PHO regulation, were the low-
er cost of its healthcare services, a preemption claim would
fail. 5 However, if the burdens of state PHO regulation
would impact a plan's interest in promoting Example B or C
(mandating administrative burdens or plan structures), the law
103. The "laws" which ERISA preempts are not limited only to state statutes. For example,
29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) provides that state actions, such as issuing "cease
and desist orders," could be preempted by ERISA, just as a state statute attempting to achieve the
same effect would be. The definition of "state law" for the purposes of section 1144 includes "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations or other state action having the effect of law, of any state." Id.
104. Under a capitated-reimbursement methodology, providers have incentives to keep
patients well. Under a fee-for-service methodology, the providers' economic incentives lead them
to treat patients for symptoms and conditions in order to maximize revenue. The Author concedes
that at mercenary extremes, some capitation providers could skimp on treatment to maximize
profits. However, by failing to treat conditions in their nascent stages, providers may incur greater
costs later when the member's condition has needlessly advanced. Conversely, a fee-for-service
reimbursement mechanism incentivizes providers to over-treat in the costliest settings. The
Author believes, however, that medical ethics, and personal and corporate integrity, reign in
providers who would consciously over-treat or under-treat to maximize profits. Still, the Author
believes that close treatment decisions made by providers may be subtly swayed by economic
motives. By incentivizing providers to keep patients well, economic motives will drive the greater
personal and public health needs of the country, not steer the providers to over-treat, and thereby,
raise healthcare expenditures.
105. See Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
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may be preempted. State regulatory enforcement actions, stat-
utes, or regulations prohibiting PHO capitation would mandate
an administrative mechanism in that such proscriptions would
not permit direct PHO capitation with local or regional pro-
viders unless such PHOs incur the unacceptable cost of HMO
licensure. In such a regulatory environment, plan administrators
would be forced to compensate such a PHO on a fee-for-ser-
vice basis, and incur the claims costs, utilization management
costs, and other expenses necessary to administer a fee-for-
service system. Also, under a capitated system, a payor can
delegate medical management, utilization review,
precertification, and other functions to the PHO. Since a
capitated PHO would have substantial incentives to reduce uti-
lization and carefully manage the care of the employer's mem-
bers, it would usually assume such functions. The employer
plan sponsor would then need only to perform oversight func-
tions if it had carefully contracted with a PHO capable of
managing its members care. In addition to incurring medical
management costs, the plan must either administer the claims
itself, or pay a third-party administrator to do so." The pur-
ported state proscription upon PHO capitation would limit an
employer-plan sponsor's ability to adopt a benefit plan of its
liking, and would force it to adopt a fee-for-service plan in a
market that is moving toward capitation or contract with a li-
censed PHO. According to the Court's analysis in Travelers,
Shaw, and FMC Corporation, such laws should be preempted.
Similarly, Example C should provide a basis to support
ERISA preemption. Managed care, with gatekeeper physicians,
medical management, and a heavy emphasis on preventative
care, seeks to lower healthcare costs by alleviating, or at least
managing, members' conditions at lower acuity stages. Man-
aged care benefit plans typically have generous preventative
care features, such as reduced copayments for physicals and
"wellness programs" which promote fitness and health lifestyle
choices. Many plans also provide generous benefits for pre-
106. Many payors and plan sponsors still require providers to submit claims or information
data even when the provider is paid a capitated amount. This information is sometimes called "en-
counter data." Encounter data tracks utilization and is useful to determine a group in rate
negotiation.
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scription drugs. The emphasis is upon improving or maintain-
ing the members' health, not treating conditions under a fee-
for-service mechanism. While it is true that plan sponsors
would not be precluded from incorporating these preventative
and primary care features into a fee-for-service plan (or con-
tracting with a licensed HMO), the effectiveness of these plan
features may be obviated by physicians still "incentivized" by a
fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism. The incentives of
capitated reimbursement, outlined earlier, could be incorporated
into the plan design to provide superior health of members at
lower costs paid to a PHO that is free from burdensome state
regulation. In that regard, state insurance regulators are man-
dating a benefit structure, an administrative mechanism, and
fee-for-service reimbursement. All of these plan design features
may be inapposite to the plan sponsor's desired goal.
Another potential basis for ERISA preemption may exist
for employers with locations in states which do permit direct
PHO capitated contracting, and states which do not. Although
few state insurance regulators currently would permit an em-
ployer group to contract directly with a PHO on a capitated
basis, the District of Columbia would reportedly permit it."17
Illinois would permit it, and Kansas reportedly has an unwrit-
ten policy which permits a self-funded plan to enter into a
capitation contract with a PHOY. 8 One of the underpinnings
of the preemption clause is to avoid conflicting state regula-
tions and allow the uniform national administration of benefit
plans." 9 A company with offices in Ohio and Illinois could
not administer the same benefit plan if the Illinois office con-
tracted with only one PHO. It must pay fee-for-service in Ohio
with no provider risk sharing permitted.1" However, in Illi-
nois, it could administer a capitated plan with a single PHO. In
this example, Ohio insurance regulators stymie the uniform
administration of this hypothetical company's benefit plan, and
may face ERISA preemption of its enforcement activities.
107. See GHAA, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing state regulatory oversight of PHOs). See
also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
108. See GHAA, supra note 17, at 11. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
109. See Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1677-78.
110. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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The Author's research reveals no case law which advances
the position that regulators may enforce state insurance laws
against PHOs that accept capitation from a self-funded employ-
er plan. However, analogies drawn from a developing line of
ERISA jurisprudence may lend support to ERISA preemption
of state insurance PHO capitation proscription. Just as limits
upon PHO capitation constrict the benefit structures and admin-
istration of employer plans, "any willing provider laws"'
11
(AWP laws) limit a self-funded employer's ability to structure
and administer its plan in the most advantageous manner."2
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Cigna
Healthplan of Louisiana v. State, Ex Rel. Ieyous," and a
Connecticut Superior Court in Hollis v. Cigna Healthcare of
Connecticut,"4 have held that ERISA preempts those states'
AWP laws. Also, while the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Virginia's AWP law was not preempted as it related
to an insured PPO in Stuart Circle Hospital Corporation v.
Aetna Health Management,"5 the Court did acknowledge that
the Virginia AWP law was preempted as it related to self-fund-
ed plans." 6
111. AWP laws require insurers and managed care plans to contract with any provider who
is willing to meet the terms and conditions of participation in the managed care network. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 41-3937 (1996) (discussing healthcare provider contracts and grievance
procedures); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3 (West 1995) (citing reimbursement agreements and
immunity issues); WYO. STAT. § 26-22-503 (1996) (citing policies with incentives or limits on
reimbursement authorized and conditions).
112. Managed care plans and managed care networks oppose AWP laws because such laws
force them to contract with more providers than their network and membership may require. AWP
laws thereby cause managed care entities to lose bargaining leverage with providers, because the
provider's incentive to cut the best deal possible is diminished. AWP laws also require managed
care entities to incur unwanted administrative costs by credentialing providers, administering
additional contracts, and by requiring the education of additional providers in network policies
and protocols. Providers generally support AWP laws because it gives them managed care
network access that the free market would not.
113. 82F.3d642at644-45 (5thCir. 1996).
114. 1994 WL 757530, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1994).
115. 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Texas Pharmacy Ass'n. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
907 F. Supp. 1019, 1025-26 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that the Texas pharmacy AWP law was
"related to" employee benefit plans, but was "saved" by the "insurance clause"), affd, modified,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2723 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997). See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)(2) (1988 &
Supp. V. 1993) (explaining that employee benefit plans are not deemed to be entities engaged in
the business of insurance or banking).
116. Stuart, 995 F.2d at 501 (stating that ERISA's deemer clause, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B), precludes employer self-funded employee benefit plans from being brought
within the scope of VA. CODE § 38.2-3407 (Virginia AWP law)). See also Richter v. Capp Care,
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 163, 166 (E.D. Va. 1994) (recognizing the inapplicability of Virginia's AWP
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In analyzing the various state's AWP laws as they "relate
to" an ERISA plan for purposes of ERISA preemption,'
1 7
these courts found that AWP laws "related to" self-funded
benefit plans and were preempted. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that application of Louisiana's AWP law imped-
ed the employers' and plan sponsor's discretion regarding the
structure of the benefit plan."' The Fourth Circuit in Stuart
Circle Hospital found that the Virginia AWP laws "relate to"
employee benefit plans by restricting the plans ability to limit
the provider pool."9 The Superior Court in Hollis stated that
the Connecticut AWP laws directly impacted plan administra-
tion, and created a potential conflict between state laws.'
And while the Fourth Circuit in Stuart Circle Hospital found
that the insurance "savings clause" applied to the Virginia
AWP law in the instant case,' all of these courts found that
AWP laws were preempted by ERISA.
The same reasoning which mandates ERISA preemption of
AWP laws would apply equally to the prohibition of unli-
censed PHOs accepting capitated payments directly from a
self-funded employer plan. Just as an AWP law mandates a
structure for employee benefit plans, PHO capitation proscrip-
tions mandate a benefit plan structure. Under an AWP law,
plans must contract with more providers than they deem opti-
mal from a cost and network design perspective, and must
incur additional administrative burdens to contract with and
administer the contractual relationships with such unneeded
providers. Analogously, plans that want to pay capitated rates
to their PHO providers are prevented from doing so and can
only contract on a fee-for-service basis. They must incur addi-
tional costs and administrative burdens in administering and
paying many fee-for-service claims, and take on medical man-
law to self-funded plans), affd 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996).
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (explaining that ERISA regulations
regarding employee health plans supersede state laws regarding the same).
118. See Cigna, 82F.3d at649.
119. Stuart, 995 F.2d at 502.
120. Hollis, 1994 W.L. 757530, at *8. AWP laws vary from state to state, with some states
free of AWP laws (New Mexico) and some states regulating both PPOs and HMOs.
121. Stuart, 995 F.2d at 504. Cf. Hollis, 1994 WL 757530, at 8. Accord Cigna, 82 F.3d at
650 (holding that the "savings clause" did not apply because the AWP law did not regulate the
business of insurance).
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agement functions to control utilization. If the plan could capi-
tate directly with the PHO, administration would be
streamlined, and medical management could be delegated to
the PHO. For these reasons, state insurance commissioners'
prohibitions on direct PHO capitation are preempted by 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), and such actions should not be sustainable
against self-funded plans and their capitated service provid-
ers.
1 2
A PHO which desires to contract directly with a self-fund-
ed plan for capitated services will be faced with the task of
convincing a court that ERISA preempts state proscriptions
against direct capitation without the benefit of precedential
authority. Making a PHOs task more daunting is obtaining the
requisite standing to assist such a claim. To attain standing to
prosecute an action against a state insurance commissioner so
that a PHO can directly capitate with a self-funded employer
plan, it may be able to do so as a "fiduciary"" of the plan
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 124 Section 1132(a)(3) per-
122. Stuart, 995 F.2d at 504. An advisory opinion by the North Carolina Attorney General
concurs with this position. See John L. Crill, Advisory Opinion: Durham County Hospital Corp.-
Contracting with Self-Insured Employee Benefit Plans and Health Care Providers, (Oct. 9, 1996)
<httpJI/www.jus.State.nc.us:801Justice/opinionadvisoryadvs.96.htm#[278]>. The North Carolina
Attorney General stated that the North Carolina HMO Act licensure provisions "relate[d] to" a
proposed self-funded employee plan involving capitated reimbursement for healthcare services,
and were "preempted" pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144. Also, the HMO Act was not "saved" from
preemption pursuant to the insurance "savings" clause. Id. However, the North Carolina
Commissioner of Insurance issued a letter on October 22, 1996 which was strongly critical of the
Attorney General's opinion. (Both the Attorney General's advisory opinion and the letter from the
Commissioner of Insurance are on file with the author).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A) (West 1997) defines a "fiduciary" as:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect
to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has nay authority or responsibility to do so, or (ii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan. Such term includes any person designated under section 1 105(c)(1)(B) of this
title.
Id.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3) states as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought- (3) by
a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates
any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations of (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
title or the terms of the plan.
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mits a fiduciary (or a beneficiary or participant) to enjoin or
seek other appropriate relief from any act or practice in viola-
tion of ERISA. While service providers generally seek to avoid
becoming ERISA "fiduciaries" because of the potential liabil-
ity,"z it is possible that a PHO may have the requisite discre-
tionary authority over plan management or administration of
the plan provisions to trigger ERISA fiduciary status. If an em-
ployer health plan would delegate medical management func-
tions (which necessarily involve treatment and benefit determi-
nations) to the PHO under a capitated reimbursement arrange-
ment, it is possible that such a PHO would be a "fiducia-
ry.'126 If such a PHO could attain "fiduciary" status, it may
then have standing to pursue an equitable action against a state
insurance commissioner, or defend itself in an action pursued
by an insurance commission. In a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case, General Motors v. California Board of Equaliza-
tion, 7 the Court held that plan fiduciaries had standing to
bring an action to enjoin enforcement of a premium tax upon
stop-loss insurance purchased by a self-funded health plan."
Also, in the case of NGS American, Incorporated v. Barnes 9
the Court enjoined the Texas Insurance commissioner from
enforcing premium taxes and other burdensome regulatory re-
quirements against third-party administrators who administer
self-funded employer plans." ° Armed with these cases, a
PHO has a colorable claim that it has standing to argue that
ERISA preempts enforcement of PHO capitation proscriptions.
Id.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (West 1996) provides that a fiduciary is personally liable for the
breach of any responsibility or duty it owes to the plan.
126. Courts often find that administrators of self-funded employer plans are not "fiduciaries"
because they do not possess discretionary authority to grant or deny claims or make other benefit
determinations on behalf of the plan. See, e.g., Pohl v. Nat'l Benefit Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d
126 (7th Cir. 1992); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp, 941 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1991).
However, it has also been held that administrators are fiduciaries because they undertake
discretionary authority to administer the employer's plan. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1993); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Health Cost Controls v. Skinner, 44
F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing plaintiff to amend its complaint and demonstrate its
"fiduciary" status).
127. 815 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1987).
128. See id. at 1308.
129. 805 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Tex. 1992), affid, 998 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1993).
130. See id. at 474.
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VII. HEALTHCARE MARKET PLACE TRENDS:
MOVING TOWARD PHO RISK ACCEPTANCE
The actions of state insurance regulators, and the NAIC in
condemning direct risk arrangements between PHOs and self-
funded employer plans, are on a potential collision course with
potent shifts in the healthcare delivery market. Just as PHOs
see the importance of contracting directly with payors, and
accepting capitated reimbursement where appropriate, employ-
ers and employer health benefit purchasing coalitions are re-
questing that PHOs enter into direct contracts with them. In the
Minneapolis-St. Paul communities of Minnesota (Twin Cities),
a coalition of large employers intend to bypass managed care
companies and directly contract with PHOs and other provider
groups."' The Twin Cities' Business Healthcare Action
Group (BHCAG) intends to offer directly contracted plans in
1997, and desires to directly contract with various provider
entities.13 The BHCAG believes better quality and lower cost
healthcare will result from these relationships. 33 It will con-
tract with another entity for claims processing and customer
service."' The compensation to be paid providers will be a
modified fee-for-service basis with a targeted utilization rate,
and rewards or penalties for providers who come in above or
below such target rate.135 The BHCAG is aware of the poten-
tial application of insurance regulation, but desires to eventual-
ly pay full capitation to the PHOs and other IDSs and provid-
ers."3 Not surprisingly, the BHCAG actions, and the provid-
131. See Ron Winlow, Employer Group Rethinks Commitment to Big HMOs, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 1995, at BI (explaining that Minnesota employers plan to negotiate directly with doctors
and hospitals); Eric Weissenstein, Cut Out the Middleman: Coalition Seeks Big Savings by Taking
the Direct Approach, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 3, 1995, at 28 (explaining that a coalition of
Minnesota employers intend to bypass managed care companies and directly contract with PHOs
and other provider groups).
132. See Weissenstein, supra note 131, at 28.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 30.
135. Seeid. at29.
136. See id. According to the GHAA Survey, however, Minnesota requires state licensure
even when a PHO accepts partial risk. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text. It is possible
that PHOs which may ultimately contract with the BHCAG may obtain licensure under the
Minnesota Integrated Service Act. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.01 (West 1995). See also supra
notes 58 to 73 and accompanying text. However, without further details regarding the structure of
the BHCAG provider relationships, it is impossible to determine the applicability of the
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er-employer risk-sharing arrangements it intends to engage in
are heavily criticized by HMOs and other health insurers.'37
When PHOs may accept capitated risk, they are moving into a
position of direct competition with HMOs and other managed
care plans.
Competition between HMOs/health insurers and PHOs and
providers is continuously being played out in Medicare legisla-
tion before the United States House of Representatives and the
United States Senate. For example, The Provider-Sponsored
Organization Act of 1997 and a companion House bill, are
presently pending whereby provider service organizations
(PSOs) would be able to contract directly with the Medicare
program without being licensed under state law."8 Under
these bills, PSOs would be subject to many of the same stan-
dards that are set out for other HMOs that are Medicare risk
contractors. 9 Additionally, the bills would amend section
1876 of the Social Security Act, thereby allowing Medicare
beneficiaries to enroll in PSOs and authorizing the health and
human services' secretary to set up both partial and full risk
payment arrangements with managed care providers.Y Simi-
larly, earlier legislation, such as the 1995 House-Senate Con-
ference Agreement Medicare legislation, included provisions
which would have permitted PSOs to contract directly for the
provision of managed healthcare services to Medicare benefi-
ciaries.' Despite these legislative attempts, it is unclear
whether states will relax regulation upon PSOs. However,
given insurance regulators' hostility towards PHO and IDS ac-
Minnesota statute.
137. See Weissenstein, supra note 131, at 30. See also Garry Cameal & Marlie Gallmetzer,
Blurred Boundaries: State Regulation of PHOs, HMO MAG., July-Aug. 1995, at 21, 24 (dis-
cussing the risks associated with new health plan models); Jonathan Gardner & Karen Pallarito,
GOP Details Medicare Plan, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 25, 1995, at 4 (arguing that if PSNs
directly contract with Medicare, other health insurers will be left out of the market).
138. See Hospital Groups Push Legislation to Contract Directly with Medicare, 3 BNA
MANAGED CAR REIP., (Feb. 5, 1997) at 126, 126-27. The Provider-Sponsored Organization Act
of 1997 (S 146) was introduced in the Senate January 21, 1997, by Senators Bill Frist (R-Tenn.)
and Jay Rockefeller (D.-W.Va.). Id. at 126. A companion bill in the House, The Medicare
Provider-Sponsored Organization Act of 1997 (HR 475), was introduced by Representatives Jim
Greenwood (R-Pa.) and Charles Stenholm (D. Tex.). Id.
139. Id. at 127.
140. Id.
141. Medicare Preservation Act of 1995, 104 H.R. 2425, § 1854(a)(1), 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
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ceptance of risk, it is likely that many states will require PSOs
to meet state HMO or health insurance licensure standards.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Changes in the mode of healthcare delivery and financing
are occurring at a manic pace. Traditional payors and providers
are all fighting to get, or maintain, a place at the proverbial
"table." This struggle is made more difficult when no one in
Washington, the capitals of the fifty states, or anywhere else,
has much of a clue what the new table will look like, how
many chairs there will be at the table, and whether the diners
will receive separate checks. One thing is certain, healthcare
consumers are looking for, and sometimes finding, ways to cut
the bill. Direct capitated reimbursement paid by self-funded
employers to PHOs and other IDSs is one mechanism which
may reduce the cost of an employer's healthcare for its em-
ployees. Paternalistic insurance regulators and self-interested
HMOs stand in the way of such market-driven reforms, and in
addition, they present substantial obstacles to such reform.
Insurance regulators could be forced to drop their objec-
tion to such arrangements through employer- and provider-led
political pressure. However, fifty insurance commissioners
would be difficult to herd into the direct capitation "corral."
ERISA-based preemption lawsuits which challenge the validity
of state insurance commissioner actions and rules are a poten-
tial mode of objection, but are costly and time-consuming.
They also have no guarantee of success. State legislation such
as the Minnesota Integrated Service Network Act 42 may
serve as a beginning point for laws which recognize that com-
munity providers and community employers should be permit-
ted to structure their own relationships without the burdens of
full HMO licensure. However, employers and provider entities
that operate in several communities and in more than one state,
should also be given the flexibility to develop innovative reim-
bursement mechanisms with minimum government intrusion. It
may be impossible to attain a national consensus among state
insurance commissioners given the nearly universal condemna-
142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62N.01 (West 1995).
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tion of PHO direct capitation. Federal legislation, although
hardly a fashionable proposition in the present political climate,
might nonetheless best serve the call for "market place driven,"
rather than "government mandated," reforms that employers are
demanding. Federal legislation which establishes uniform fed-
eral standards for PHO and IDS capitation and compliance
would aid these "market driven" reforms. The "playing field"
among the various states would be leveled and the reasonable
concerns of state insurance commissioners probably would be
accommodated. Absent uniform legislation, or Supreme Court
blessed ERISA preemption, however, the potential cost-saving
benefits of direct PHO capitation will be unrealized.
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APPENDIX A: Reprinted from GHAA Survey
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CHART 2: STATE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF PHOS"
Key: N State Oversight/Licensure Required 0 No State Oversight * Unclear
PHO CONTRACTS DIRECTLY WITH ....
STATE EMPLOYER: EMPLOYER: EMPLOYER: LICENSED HEALTH
FEE SCHEDULE PREPAID PRESET PLAN: PREPAID
SELF-FUNDING CAPITATION BUDGET CAPITATION
(No Risk) (Full Risk) (Partial Risk) (Downstream Risk)
AL 0 a 0
AK 0
AZ 0 0 •
AR 0
CA 0 0 0 1
co 0 U
CT 0 a U
DE 0 U C
DC 0 0 0
GA 0 1 1 C
HI
ID 0 U
IL 0 1 0
IN 1 1 0
1A 111 0 C
KS 0
KY 0 N 0
LA 0 I N 0
ME 0 U 0
MD 0 13
MA 0 U 0
Mt 0 E 0
. This chart is reprinted from GHAA, supra note 17, at 11-12. The findings summarized in this chart are
based upon the responses given by state insurance and health department, over the telephone on how PHOs are
regulated as risk-bearing entities. However, many of the states that report that they require PHO licensure, in
practice do not.
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PHO CONTRACTS DIRECTLY WITH ....
STATE
EMPLOYER: EMPLOYER: EMPLOYER: LICENSED HEALTH
FEE SCHEDULE PREPAID PRESET PLAN: PREPAID
SELF-FUNDING CAPITATION BUDGET CAPITATION
(No Risk) (Full Risk) (Partial Risk) (Downstream Risk)
MN 0 N 0
MO 0
icra
NE 0 U 0
N H 0 0
NJ 0 U U 0
NM 0 N a 0
NY 0 0 U 0
NC i5 U 0
ND 0 0 0 0
OH S U U 0
OK 0 0
OR 0 5
PA 0 U
Ii1 0
SC 15 a N 0
SD 0 U
7N 0 a a 0
TX 0 0 W 0
UT 0 0 a
VT 0 0 0 0
VA 1 E U 0
WA 0 f a
V 0 
0 U U 0
y0 a 0
1. California law requires all PHOs that accept global capitation to be hcensed as an HMO under the Knox-Keene Act.
2. Florida DOI is currently working on legislation that would regulate PHO-HMO contracts.
3. Maryland's Department of Insurance position conflicts with state Attorney General opinions re: regulation of risk-
bearing entities.
4. Nevada may require icensure pursuant to its unauthorizcd insurer statute
5. North and South Carolina require registration as a PPO

